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NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw--DUE PROCESS-LABOR DISPUTES UNDER
WISCONSIN LABOR CoDE.-Organized labor, for years, has contested the
use of the injunction in labor disputes, and has long been active in legis-
lative circles to secure statutory relief from the use by the courts of this
powerful weapon.' In 1887 such injunctions were practically unknown.
Unlawful activities by labor in connection with industrial disputes were
dealt with in the criminal courts or by self-help on the part of employ-
ers. It was not until the great railway strike of 1894 directed against
the Pullman Company that the full possibilities of the injunction in
the field of labor disputes were generally realized? When the Supreme
Court upheld the injunction, a precedent was created which had great
influence in the state courts, and the budding tendency of those courts
to grant injunctive relief in labor cases was confirmed The period
from 1895 to the beginning of the present decade saw a progressive
increase in the number of labor injunctions granted by the state courts.
All these developments met with uncompromising hostility on the
part of organized labor which sought relief through legislation. The
Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, was supposed to be a step in the right
direction.4 Indeed Samuel Gompers informed the trade union move-
ment that the words, "the labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce" as contained in Section Four of the Act were
sledge hammer blows to the wrongs and injustices so often inflicted
upon the workers. But labor was doomed to disappointment. The
Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deerngo held that the
term "labor dispute" as used in Section 20 of the act must be confined
to one between an employer and his employees. This decision pre-
vented the Clayton Act from giving effective support to labor in its
indeavor to strengthen its bargaining position; for the strength of that
position depends upon broad unionization, which can only be secured
by allowing the unions to use their available weapons against recalci-
trant employers even though there be no present dispute as to wages
or condition of employment between a particular employer and his
employees. After the Clayton Act was passed numerous states enacted
anti-injunction legislation substantially following the federal act. The
state courts, including that of Wisconsin, followed the construction
of the Supreme Court in holding that a labor dispute could exist only
where there existed the relationship of employer and employee.7
I FRANKFURTER & GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCrION (1930).2 United States v. Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L.ed. 1092 (1895).
-5 Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307 (1888) ; Murdock, Kerr & Co.
v. Walker, 152 Pa. 595, 25 At]. 492 (1893).
'38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (1926). Section 20 provided in part:
"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case involving or
growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment,
unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury .. ."5 Frankfurter & Greene, Legislation Affecting Labor Injunctions (1929) 38 YALE
L. J. 879. The identical phrase appears in the Wisconsin Statutes of 1927 in
Section 133.05.
*254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L.ed. 344 (1921).
Monday Co. v. Auto. etc. Workers, 171 Wis. 532, 177 N.W. 867 (1920) ; Gevas
v. Green etc. Club, 99 N.J. Eq. 770, 134 At. 309 (1926) ; Harvey v. Chapman,
226 Mass. 191, 115 N.E. 304 (1917).
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
After the decision in the Duplex case, injunctions in labor contro-
versies seemed to be the order of the day.s Many disinterested persons
became highly critical of the courts because of such intervention. Con-
gress was besieged with various bills seeking to restrict the power of
courts to issue injunctions in cases involving dynamic social and eco-
nomic problems. In the great economic struggle between capital and
labor, the decided trend of public opinion seemed to be toward the
conviction that labor is entitled, through the medium of collective bar-
gaining, to a greater recognition of its rights and that legislation should
be enacted further to foster the welfare and interests of the wage-
earner. This crystallization of public opinion culminated in the passage
by Congress in 1932 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Several states have
enacted laws identical in nature."
The Norris Act, and the state statutes which have adopted its terms,
sought to circumvent the decision of the Duplex case by including in
the definition of "labor dispute" the clause "regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee." This enactment marks the dawn of a new era in the domain
of labor injunctions. The various state courts whose legislatures have
added the clause to the bill, are giving full scope to the definition which
the legislatures intended it should have.'0 The Wisconsin court in two
recent cases has upheld the right of others than the immediate dis-
putants to take part in labor disputes." In the first of these, the Ameri-
can Furniture Co. v. Chauffers, Teamsters, and Helpers Union,2 there
was no dispute between the employer and the employees. The defend-
ant union picketed the store to compel the company by economic pres-
sure to execute certain contracts with them. The plaintiff's employees
were opposed to signing these contracts. The court in a four to three
decision upheld the right of the union to picket the store. In the second
case which was decided at the same term of court,' a labor dispute
was found to exist when there was a controversy between a union and
a contractor whom the union sought to compel to obey union rules
under which the contractor would be unable to work himself though
there was no dispute between the contractor and his employees and
he was willing to adopt all other union terms. Although the two sub-
jects involved in these decisions lend themselves to individual and per-
sonal views they were not decided on that basis. They are the result of
a solemn effort to give full and true effect to the legislative mandate.
8 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, 66 L.ed. 254 (1921) ; WrrE,
THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES, pp. 272-273 (1932); Note (1935) 33
MICH. L. REv. 777.
947 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-115 (1932); Wis. Stat. (1937)
§ 103.51 et seq.; Riddlesbarger, State Anti-Injunction Legislation (1935) 14
ORE. L. REv. 501.
10 Wallace Co. v. International Assc. of Mechanics, 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1090
(1936) ; Starr v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Workers' Union, 155 Or. 634, 63
P. (2d) 1104 (1936); American Furniture Co. v. Chauffers, Teamsters, and
Helpers Union, 222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250 (1936) ; Senn v. Tile Layers Pro-
tective Union, 222 Wis. 383, 168 N.W. 270 (1936). See also Schuster v. Inter-
national Ass'n. of Machinists, (Ill. App. 1937) 12 N.E. (2d) 50.
-222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250 (1936); 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 270 (1936).
'222 Wis. 338, 268 N.W. 250 (1936).
1- 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 270 (1936).
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In Wallace Co. v. International Association of Mechanics, 4 the Oregon
Supreme Court held the statute applicable to an employer's suit to
enjoin picketing by a labor union though none of the employees were
members of the union and no dispute existed between the employer-
and the employees.
The federal courts which have passed upon the question have not
been in complete accord. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan held a labor dispute to exist where the union had requested
the plaintiff moving picture theater to discharge from its employ a
sign writer who was not a member of any union when the theater
refused." The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
taken the opposite viewpoint. In United Electric Coal Companies v.
Rice"" the plaintiff had a contract with the United Mine Workers of
America, and this contract called for the employment of members of
this union. Many of the employees joined a new union, and it demanded
that the employer break his contract with the old union; there was no
dispute as to wages and other conditions of employment. The court in
affirming the decree enjoining defendants reached the conclusion that
a liberal interpretation of the labor dispute provision of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act required the existence of a dispute between the em-
ployer and the employee growing directly out of their relationship.
In Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co.,17 the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit adhered to the construction which they had given
in the Rice case. The question involved the right of a union to picket
the plaintiff's market in Milwaukee. In that case there was no dispute
between the employer and employees, and the labor union did not rep-
resent any of the employees of the plaintiff. It was held that no labor
dispute existed within the meaning of the Wisconsin or Norris-
LaGuardia Acts, and that on the authority of the Rice case there must
be a labor dispute between the employer and his employees before
outsiders might participate. The Lauf case has recently been considered
by the Supreme Court of the United States."3 The judgment of the
circuit court of appeals was reversed and the case was remanded to
the district court. The Supreme Court held that the district court was
bound by the construction given to the state act by the state supreme
court, that the state court had decided that a dispute like his was a
labor dispute, and that the district court had not in any event made
sufficient findings of fact with respect to irreparable injuries and lack
of police protection as is required under the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
support any injunction which the court may otherwise issue. Whether
the particular acts of picketing and publicizing could be permitted,
assuming that the dispute was a labor dispute within the meaning of
the Wisconsin Labor Code, the Court said, must await determination
after further inquiry before the district court.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the American Furniture
Company case had before it these two cases from the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit. Despite the decision in
14 155 Or. 652, 63 P. (2d) 1104 (1936).
"1 Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, (D. C. Mich. 1934) 6 F.
Supp. 164.
1 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935) 80 F. (2d) 1.
'V(C.C.A. 7th, 1936) 82 F. (2d) 68.
IS Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Company, U.S.L. Week, March 1, 1938, at 735.
19381 NOTE
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the Lauf case which specifically interpreted the Wisconsin Labor Code,
the court, with Mr. Justice Wickhem writing the decision, held that the
language of the act was plain and unambiguous, and did not exact as a
prerequisite to a labor dispute that there be a controversy between an
employer and his employees. He specifically held that the statute makes'
the scope of a controversy broad enough to include questions relating
to association or representation of persons relative to conditions of
employment or industrial relations, and this regardless of whether or
not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,8 a which was
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court," the court
was faced with the contention that the right to work in a business with
his own hands is a right guaranteed to a man by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and that the state may not authorize unions to employ publicity
and picketing to induce him to refrain from exercising it in the absence
of any dispute between him and his men. The Wisconsin court in refus-
ing the injunction held that what the union was doing was asserting
their rights under the acts of the legislature for the purpose of enhanc-
ing work for themselves, and those whom they represented, and since
their act of peaceful picketing was a lawful form of appeal to the public
to turn its patronage from the plaintiff to the concerns in which the wel-
fare of the members of the union was bound up, such action was justi-
fiable. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Supreme Court in up-
holding the decision reached by the Wisconsin court, held that the
Wisconsin labor law was a matter wholly for the public policy of the
state and as such was not the concern of the federal courts. It is inter-
esting to note that the same principles which motivated his dissenting
opinion in the Duplex case rendered seventeen years ago are found in
his opinion in the Senn case.2
The Wisconsin legislature and supreme court have put a strong
weapon in the hands of the labor unions. There is no doubt but that
the Wisconsin law was drawn to promote unionism, just as the same
idea was written into our "little Wagner law" in the "all-union agree-
ment clause" by which an employer and a labor organizer can bargain
to affect the rights of the workers through a closed shop agreement 2 1
Whether the unions will be able to handle the problem intelligently, is
one that will become more apparent in the future.
RICHARD M. RICE.
-a222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 270 (1936).
10301 U.S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L.ed. 1229 (1937).
- Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 Led.
349 (1921).
= Wxs. STAT. (1937) § 111.07.
